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[Shutter]

*In our interview with Anderson, Anderson said that Cooper made one more call after 8:05 asking that the plane be slowed and leveled. Not long after that the crew detected "oscillations" and they thought Cooper was out on the stairs.

That would change the jump time if 8:05 wasn't the last contact....

[Robert99]

I would think Amboy was too far away to either see, or hear the plane. it's about 6+ miles from the known flight path. on a clear evening, probably....

I guess that would depend on where the plane was (and how low) - which was always the point Dona was making. That 305 passed over Amboy. That the plane she heard was 305. We know from the Transcript that Cooper asked for the plane to be slowed and leveled just prior to bailing. Was the plane straining during that maneuver?

Others in other locations claimed to have seen or heard the plane also. A lady listening to flight comms at her relative's airport said 305 went 'this way' or 'that-a-way'.  A plane in hand is worth two planes in the bush! A chute near Amboy is worth two chutes on the plane. And, anyone leaving a chute near Amboy would have had to cross the Atlantic Ocean in a birch bark canoe ... to get back to London, where Kenny's help was waiting! It all adds up. 

Tricolor reported no plane over his head!    What myths did Tricolor tell, if any? Tricolor dealt directly with FBI and searchers during the search. What was Tricolor's catalog of stories? It's Tricolor I want to talk to!

Georger, Cooper asked for the airliner to be slowed down and leveled off just after take off from Seattle.  This was because he was having trouble getting the rear stairs to open.

There is no record of him making such a request just before jumping which he did about 30 minutes after the about incident.

7:50-53  quick climb 7000 to 10,000 and hold. 170-180 knots. Crew on O2]

7:54 pm     
MSP:      As soon as reasonably sure the man has left the quicker you can land.
305:       Roger. Miss Mucklow said he apparently has the knapsack around him
and thinks he will attempt a jump. 
MSP:      Roger. After leaving this freq go to 131.8 we have direct phone patch
There (to Company and FBI)
305:       Roger.

8:01 pm    
MSP:      What is altitude?
305:      Now at 15 thousand.  (typo) Indicator 160. Fuel flow 4000. 15 degree flap.
Gear down. CQN will stay at 10,000 until he has left.
MSP:      Roger.

8:05 pm            
305:      Have attempted on two occasions to make contact with individual he
did not reply. Then used PA system and he said, “Everything is Ok”.
MSP:      Roger.

*In our interview with Anderson, Anderson said that Cooper made one more call after 8:05 asking that the plane be slowed and leveled. Not long after that the crew detected "oscillations" and they thought Cooper was out on the stairs.

8:12 pm    
305:   Getting some oscillations in the cabin. Must be doing something with
 the air stairs.
MSP:      Roger.

*Anderson reports a discussion lasting several minutes debating if a pressure spike meant Cooper had left. According to Anderson, Rataczak then called it in. This is not included in Transcript. 
 
8:12 - 8:20 transcript is blank.

8:20 pm    
305:   Called. (no response from Cooper)
MSP:      Go to 131.8 (phone patch to company on that freq.)
SEADD:   He (Nyrop?) is already on that frequency.
MSP:      Roger. We are on the phone and will be talking to him shortly.
SEADD:   Roger

Georger, As I understand your comments with the * above, you have talked to Anderson.  Would you be willing to elaborate on your talk(s) with him?  Or with anyone else you may, or may not, have talked to on the Cooper matter.

[Robert99]

*In our interview with Anderson, Anderson said that Cooper made one more call after 8:05 asking that the plane be slowed and leveled. Not long after that the crew detected "oscillations" and they thought Cooper was out on the stairs.

That would change the jump time if 8:05 wasn't the last contact....

The jump time is going to remain in about the 8:11 - 8:14 time frame.  If I remember correctly, Georger has information that may support this interval or even a tighter time frame.  Georger and I discussed this point privately, based on all available information, some time back but I can't find the e-mails right now.

[Shutter]

I'm basing this on the crew stating he jumped 5-10 minutes after the last contact. now, if 8:05 wasn't the last contact it should move the time forward.

[Robert99]

I'm basing this on the crew stating he jumped 5-10 minutes after the last contact. now, if 8:05 wasn't the last contact it should move the time forward.

True.  But exactly what the crew said, and the time that they said it, remains a mystery for the most part.

[georger]

*In our interview with Anderson, Anderson said that Cooper made one more call after 8:05 asking that the plane be slowed and leveled. Not long after that the crew detected "oscillations" and they thought Cooper was out on the stairs.

That would change the jump time if 8:05 wasn't the last contact....

The jump time is going to remain in about the 8:11 - 8:14 time frame.  If I remember correctly, Georger has information that may support this interval or even a tighter time frame.  Georger and I discussed this point privately, based on all available information, some time back but I can't find the e-mails right now.

That's right ... if Anderson's account is accurate (we posted all of this years ago but nobody was listening?) ... (a) Cooper made one more call after 8:05 asking that the plane be (further leveled and SLOWED) and he was accommodated. Anderson didn't recall exactly but he said Cooper's last call and the final adjustment was just before or almost coterminous with the 'oscillations' beginning. Anderson says they called to the back but got no response and then the pressure spike "bump" occurred. Andy said Rataczak immediately commented "he's gone - he jumped" but Scott wasn't sure and he himself (Andy) wasn't sure. Anderson said this uncertainty was one of the reasons everyone wanted a test flight to try and duplicate the conditions of the oscillations and bump, they had experienced. But, Anderson then threw a curve (in the interview) saying "but we didn't call it in immediately" ! That statement alone made us go back and ask for a second interview and Andy obliged. Because, if they didn't call it in immediately when did they call the bump in  and how much time passed between the "bump" and them actually reporting it. This is the source of a significant time-position error, as I read Andy's statements.

At the second interview Andy was specific and said "WE DISCUSSED IT BEFORE CALLING IT IN". I asked "how much time elapsed between the bump and calling it in?" Answer, several minutes. Andy explained they didn't know what the oscillations and bump meant but they were sure it had something to do with Cooper leaving. I asked "did you go back and look? and Anderson dodged that question. He never answered that directly. He said it was Rataczak who broke the indecision and called it in on his own. And then the question of their position at the time of the "bump" came up. Andy says 'the best we could give was an estimate'! I asked: "did your estimate fit with Rataczak's statement that "we were in the suburbs of Vancouver when the bump happened, and could see the lights of Portland coming up"? Anderson replied: "Yes. We may have been even a little further south. The best we could give was an estimate. We didnl't know what the pressure spikes meant at the time". So I asked: "Did Rataczak know what the bump meant?", and Andy replied "Yes. He was the first to make the connection. But Scott wasn't sure. That's why we discussed it before calling it in."  So... it appears it was Rataczak who broke the stalemate of discussion and he abruptly called it in to report it. They then tried to estimate what their position had been and the time, and the discussion that ensued accounts for the black out in the transcript ending finally at about 8:20.

Now. Let me be quick to point out there are people who strongly disagree with this interpretation. One of those is Sluggo, I believe. A number of people say the blackout in the Transcript was due to other factors - other reasons. I asked Andy directly if he has ever read the PI Transcript and he said "No. I don't know what that is". So Andy was no help in explaining the socalled blackout in communications that occurs in the Transcript between 8:14 and 8:20..

That is the best I can offer. We had three separate interviews with Andy over a period of a week where we submitted questions in advance, Andy replied, and we then submitted our next round of questions.  The whole thing took about a week.  It was Anderson, myself, and two other people.

Again, a good share of this was reported at DZ but there was turmoil at DZ at the time and nobody seemed interested (or seemed to believe this was real). I even forget the dates. But it should all still be at DZ.

The important points are: (a) they thought the oscillations were the stairs vibrating after being opened, or Cooper trying the stairs, (b) they didnt recognize what the bump meant but Rataczak thought it was Cooper jumping off the stairs, (c) they did not report it immediately due to uncertainty, (d) they were already hooked up to report because they had already reported "oscillations", (e) Rataczak broke the stalemate and reported the "bump" ie pressure spike, (f) then they and others tried to estimate their position when the bump happened, and (g) they already knew Cooper was ready to jump, (h) Cooper called just after 8:05 and asked the plane be slowed and leveled ... and then the oscillations started...

The last comms are:


8:12 pm    t1
305:   Getting some oscillations in the cabin. Must be doing something with
 the air stairs.
MSP:      Roger.

[Note@  8:12 10-15k 15& flp wheels dwn  -  Cabin Oscillations – Trim? – ‘must
be doing something with air stairs]


T9.6
      
8:13.14     305      Center? 405 (unintel) 20.9 10,000.      
     SEAR5   Northwest 305 ident
8:15.52     SEAR5   Northwest 305, the Portland uh altimeter 3003.
305   0 0 3
*[8:13 10,00 feet]

*[ 5 min BLANK PERIOD IN COMMS ?  NO MENTION OF COOPER BAILOUT]



8:20 pm    t1  [Cooper may have jumped Something has happened]
305:   Called. (called to Cooper? No answer & think he has jumped?)
MSP:      Go to 131.8 (phone patch to company on that freq.)
SEADD:   He (Nyrop?) is already on that frequency.
MSP:      Roger. We are on the phone and will be talking to him shortly.
SEADD:   Roger.

               
My guess is Rataczak finally reported the bump (not recorded in the Transcript) some time in the 8:13 to 8:15 period? The bump and Cooper bailing would be maybe 8:13 - 8:15  ... I think its obvious they were discussing the matter with NWA and others by the 8:20 point above, shown in the Transcript. Because they are reporting "oscillations" at 8:12 above; he bump had apparently not happened yet, and their reporting of a bump had definitely not happened at 8:12. That sets the bump after 8:12 and the reporting of a bump perhaps 1-2 minutes after that.   
   

[Shutter]

I was under the impression they slowed the plane down so Cooper could get the stairs down just after takeoff? that is supposedly when, and why Rat switched to 30 degree's on the flaps.

[Bruce A. Smith]

When I spoke with Rataczak in 2009, his most definitive statement to me about times and positions was his declaration that Cooper jumped at 8:13. He said he was certain about the time.

That said, one of the things that jumps out for me from the Larry Carr commentaries in the DZ transcripts via the WSHM is Larry's growing belief that Cooper's LZ was further south from Ariel, possibly as far south as Orchards. That would put the LZ-A as much as 15 miles to the south. If the 8:13 is in error for the jump, but correct for the Ariel fly-over, and Cooper jumped over Orchards, then the 3-miles-a-minute makes the time 8:18.

But if 8:13 is correct for the jump, and Orchards is correct for the LZ, then how do we get the flight path off by 15 miles? Can we re-set the times, Shut, according to the simulations you've been using, to soak up the time and mileage? If so, we might have a better idea of what was redacted, altered, reconfigured, etc.

[Shutter]

When I spoke with Rataczak in 2009, his most definitive statement to me about times and positions was his declaration that Cooper jumped at 8:13. He said he was certain about the time.

That said, one of the things that jumps out for me from the Larry Carr commentaries in the DZ transcripts via the WSHM is Larry's growing belief that Cooper's LZ was further south from Ariel, possibly as far south as Orchards.

So, if we go by any of those time frames 8:11 - 8:15 and use the known flight path, Cooper had to of survived.

[Shutter]

The only real time conflicts I'm having is in the jump zone area. the time does not match the map.

The path from Seattle to the Toledo (malay intersection)`is very similar each time I fly this leg of the flight. the same goes from the Malay intersection to Merwin Lake, or crossing the Lewis river, I get about the same times as the map shows.

The problem starts just after Battleground. I start losing time between Battleground, and crossing the Columbia, it doesn't match the map. it takes over 8 minutes to reach the Columbia. it's a wild ride through this area with a jet....

Since we have no radar data, or cockpit recordings we have to go by what they are stating, even though they state "the believed flight path" then you have the conflicts from the pilots....it goes on and on...

[Robert99]

The only real time conflicts I'm having is in the jump zone area. the time does not match the map.

The path from Seattle to the Toledo (malay intersection)`is very similar each time I fly this leg of the flight. the same goes from the Malay intersection to Merwin Lake, or crossing the Lewis river, I get about the same times as the map shows.

The problem starts just after Battleground. I start losing time between Battleground, and crossing the Columbia, it doesn't match the map. it takes over 8 minutes to reach the Columbia. it's a wild ride through this area with a jet....

Since we have no radar data, or cockpit recordings we have to go by what they are stating, even though they state "the believed flight path" then you have the conflicts from the pilots....it goes on and on...

Shutter and Bruce,  There is a VERY simple solution to your problems.  And I have mentioned this any number of times before and included supporting information, so I will only outline it this time.

At the Malay Intersection, the airliner left V23 and proceeded straight to the Canby Intersection south of Portland.  This would bypass Portland and pass within a few hundred feet of the money find location at Tina Bar.

On the southbound flight, the airliner had the usual radio link to ARINC Inc. facilities and also a voice link of their radio communications with ARINC was patched directly to various offices including Seattle and Minneapolis.

An ARINC teletype message time stamped as being sent at 8:22 went to various offices and that message stated that the airliner was 23 DME miles south of the Battleground VORTAC (then known as the Portland VORTAC).  The 8:22 time was the time the teletype message was sent and not the time the information was received by voice radio at the ARINC facility.

A couple of years ago, ARINC personnel told Fred Poynter (WSHM) and myself that a certain amount of time was required after receiving a voice message from an aircraft for the ARINC personnel to "format" the message and send it by teletype.  So the voice message was received at the ARINC facility several minutes before 8:22.

One of the papers in the George Harrison collection at WSHM gives a time of 8:18 for the voice message receipt.  This is the time that the airliner was 23 DME miles south of the Battleground VORTAC.  That location is just 4 nautical miles from the Canby Intersection and about 19 nautical miles from the money find location at Tina Bar.

Assuming a ground speed of about 3 nautical miles per minute, it would have taken approximately 6 minutes to fly from Tina Bar to that 23 DME point.  That would put the airliner over Tina Bar at about 8:12 PM.  That is about as good as we can get using the published data.

One reason for wanting the Seattle ATC transcripts is that they use the same clock for everything and have precise times for their communication exchanges.

Simply bypassing Portland on the west side as discussed above would eliminate ALL flight path problems in the Portland area.  It's that straight forward. 

[Shutter]

Meaning?

[Robert99]

Meaning?

Meaning that I hit the wrong key very early in typing the post.  See the modified version of the post.

[Shutter]

Meaning?

Meaning that I hit the wrong key very early in typing the post.  See the modified version of the post.

Big difference 

My point was showing the error's in the map. at this point I'm not trying to find any alternate route. it's very possible, but currently only looking at the known flight path....

[georger]

When I spoke with Rataczak in 2009, his most definitive statement to me about times and positions was his declaration that Cooper jumped at 8:13. He said he was certain about the time.

That said, one of the things that jumps out for me from the Larry Carr commentaries in the DZ transcripts via the WSHM is Larry's growing belief that Cooper's LZ was further south from Ariel, possibly as far south as Orchards. That would put the LZ-A as much as 15 miles to the south. If the 8:13 is in error for the jump, but correct for the Ariel fly-over, and Cooper jumped over Orchards, then the 3-miles-a-minute makes the time 8:18.

But if 8:13 is correct for the jump, and Orchards is correct for the LZ, then how do we get the flight path off by 15 miles? Can we re-set the times, Shut, according to the simulations you've been using, to soak up the time and mileage? If so, we might have a better idea of what was redacted, altered, reconfigured, etc.

8:13 would just fit within the Anderson scenario, imo. Yes - the Carr-Sluggo discussion on DZ settled on Orchards. (Sluggo even wanted to dig up some cemeteries in that area     ). Then how does money get to Tina Bar without Cooper walking to that area?

It gets there by shifting the flight path west bypassing Portland on the west side in a straight path south from the Malay intersection. Or, perhaps flying the west side of V23 then jogging west around Portland?