My Discussions With A Senior Director At NORAD Regarding The NORJACK Case
I had the extraordinary opportunity to speak to a gentleman with unique insights into the SAGE radar system. His name is Len Camp. He was a lieutenant in the Canadian Forces, assigned to SAGE in Syracuse, NY as a flight controller in 1973. Two years later, he was promoted to the rank of Captain and was rated as a NORAD expert controller. He served with NORAD for 28 years and ended his career as a senior director for NORAD with a rank of Lt. Col.. He graduated from Syracuse with a degree in mathematical physics. He then graduated from the University of North Dakota with a degree in Space-based Radar and Small Satellites. He was trained in Aerospace Project Management with the Canadian Forces. He is currently the founder, CEO, and owner of HyperAero Consulting which consults the government and private companies on hypersonic aircraft.
NORAD was a joint US-Canada military organization intended to provide early warning in the event of a Soviet attack on the North American continent. There were a few dozen Canadians and Americans “co-manning” at each other’s control centers and headquarters. This ensured that bi-national cooperation was a critical part of the mission.
Lt. Col. Camp's expertise was in fighter control, so he had a ton of insight into how SAGE worked with interceptor jets. He said that there is a great deal of verbal communication between military and civilian air traffic control. When asked about Ammerman “taking over” the F-106s, Mr. Camp said that while it is feasible that one or both of the F-106 pilots was monitoring FAA frequencies and perhaps passing on first-hand information to Ammerman, the military would have absolutely retained control of the fighters during the intercept in accordance with FAA regulations (Order JO 7610.4W Special Operations).
When asked about the retention of the SAGE radar data, Mr. Camp was emphatic that the data would have been saved. His words were “absolutely and undoubtedly” all of the relevant data from the NORJACK hijacking would have been recorded and saved. In the event of an unusual incident, the weapons team, control center supervisor, or senior director could order the computer room to initiate a record for later analysis and/or evidence. For an event such as a commercial hijacking, the SAGE control center supervisor would likely have requested the computer personnel to put the data of the event “on record”. Recording SAGE radar data was a common occurrence and something the techs would have been extremely familiar with. In fact, he said that any aircraft - civilian or military squawking an emergency IFF (Identity Friend Or Foe). Mode 3 :hijack”, “lost comms”, or “emergency” would have automatically been recorded. The computer could then print this data out on computer card decks or long-form paper. This data would have been preserved as a stack of IBM cards for an indefinite period of time.
Further, a “data reduction” could be done to eliminate extraneous data in the airspace to only focus on the relevant aircraft. This would provide a summary of the recorded radar data and IFF tracks.
When asked about the possible construction of the yellow flight path map, Camp said that SAGE did not have the ability to print out a map. However, SAGE would print out the data, and it would then be translated by hand into GEOREF or the World Geographic Reference System. That could then be translated by hand into latitude and longitude. SAGE also had a special team of people who would do this in real time. There was a large glass display where data could be inputted using manual inputs: setting up special control zones, inputting flight plans, airbase weapons status, weather reports, etc.
So, they might receive a verbal report like: “from the Hawkeye beacon, 255 at 27,000” and could then manually plot that on the glass display. It would then be input into the AN/FSQ-7 Combat Direction Central or simply Q-7 which was the overall command and control system used by NORAD as a whole.
Each SAGE blockhouse kept a qualified air crew on staff to provide expertise in any aviation matters that the radar techs and computer personnel might not be familiar with. It’s possible that this was Capt. Spangler’s duty on the night of the hijacking. Capt. Spangler was a C-141 pilot attached to the 62nd Airlift Wing.
Mr. Camp suspects that Capt. Spangler received the printouts of the IFF codes and the corresponding SAGE radar symbology. This symbology would have then been translated into GEOREF and then into longitude and latitude along with the corresponding timestamps. .These timestamps would be down to the tenth of a second. The time frame of the computer is roughly 15 seconds with three sub-frames of about 5 seconds each. He considers it very likely Spangler chose the exact times spaced about a minute or apart to keep the clutter down on the map. Thus, it is highly likely that the radar plot points expressed in red Xs are exact down to within plus/minus 5 seconds. This means that if between 8:00:05 and 7:59:57, Spanger would have chosen 7:59:57 because it is closest to the round 8:00. This is significant regarding the timing of the map plot points.
Mr. Camp then believes that Capt. Spangler would have sat down at a drafting table and manually translated the GEOREF data into standard longitude and latitude onto the yellow sectional map.Later, an FBI agent would have added the blue ink “connect-the-dots and times. Camp considers it likely that the FBI would only have received the first plot of 7:54 and then been allowed to transfigure the rest of the information on its own.
When asked about any confusion in the aircraft with the data, Mr. Camp said there was absolutely no chance that SAGE would not be able to differentiate between the hijacked airliner, the Delta Darts or the T-33. The computer places track symbology on the fighter's data based on its call sign (ex. MP06) and a unique MODE 2 IFF assigned to each airframe as primary. The chase aircraft would be given a generic track number, usually UP21, but could also have a unique mode 2 code to help with track. Again, redundancy. It was literally used to “separate radar traffic”
Mode 2 was military only. It provides a 4-digit octal (12 bit) unit code or tail number. Mode 3 micivilian and provides a 4-digit octal (12 bit) identification code for the aircraft, assigned by the air traffic controller. Commonly referred to as a squawk code. Thus, the IFF codes for the chase planes and the hijacked plane would have been completely different and recognizable both to the radar operator to on the printed radar data provided to Capt. Spangler.\
Meanwhile, the airliner with a Mode 3 “hijack” gives the computer enhanced IFF to use in tracking logic. In other words, the hijacked airliner would have been the “star of the show” and would definitely be identifiable relative to the other aircraft.
When asked about SAGE “losing an aircraft”, Mr. Camp said the only way SAGE could “lose” an aircraft is if the aircraft fell below 10,000 feet. Gaps in coverage might occur due to terrain masking. Typically, TRACON or low altitude “gap filler” radar could provide that lost coverage if needed. Moreover, when asked about radar coverage, up to 20 radars could be tied to a single SAGE control center. He believes McChord had a dozen in 1971, perhaps more. Interesting, the first plot on the USAF map is 7:54 which corresponds to when Flight 305 reached an altitude of 10,000 feet AMSL.
Importantly, there were military radars all over the country, not just along the coasts and borders. The entire 360 degree sweep of the airspace would be fed to SAGE. Thus, SAGE was not just outward looking but its radar provided coverage to the entire North American continent.
Regarding the reliability of the SAGE system, by the 1970s, SAGE had a 99.5% reliability rate, according to Lt. Col. Camp. It also had BUIC or Back Up Interceptor Control sites that would act as redundancy should SAGE ever be knocked out by an attack. This is part of the military’s active redundancy concept. There was always a back-up to a back-up to a back-up.
Interestingly, Len put me in contact with the gentleman who was working the T-33’s training mission that night. We’ll call him John because he doesn’t want to be talked about publicly. It was a 3 on 1 mission with the Air National Guard. John handed off the T-33 to another operator who was working the F-106 chase planes.. He said that the 3 F-101 pilots were shocked that their target was diverted to a higher priority mission. This man was sitting next to the gentleman who was working the F-106 chase jets, but doesn’t remember much else because he was focused on his F-101s who no longer had a target.
So, what are the implications of Mr. Camp’s information?
First, we know what data was provided from SAGE. Second, we know how that data was used to create the flight path map.
We also know the margin of error of the map - one nautical miles north-east-west-south and 5 seconds one way or the other. This means the yellow USAF map is far more precise than previously believed. It gives a tighter north-south error than we have suspected.
We know that it eliminates any possibility that the map was constructed using faulty data.
We know that it eliminates the possibility that the chase jets were confused with 305. The SAGE radar data would have provided the Mode 2 and Mode 3 IFF codes that would have allowed Capt. Spanger to quickly identify which was the jetliner and which were the trailing aircraft.
We know it eliminates any possibility that SAGE would have “lost” Flight 305. Even if the radar operator was incompetent, the system still would have recorded the data. Also, SAGE recorded everything within a 360 circle of its airspace.
We know it eliminates any possibility that SAGE was “down” that night. It had a 99.5% reliability rate, and had multiple redundant systems in the event of a catastrophic failure.
Clearly, Mr. Camp’s testimony puts to rest any notion of a “westerly flight path”. The radar data is sound. The construction of the flight path map would have been based on sound and unimpeachable data.
If any question of a flight path outside the confines of Victor 23 ever existed, they should be squashed now. A flight path outside of Victor 23 was always fanciful and existed outside the boundaries of actual evidence. Mr. Camp’s testimony only underscores that. Moreover, Mr. Camp’s testimony is completely congruent with the FBI files we have seen.
There are two anchor points in this case. The first one is the flight path. The second is the money find at Tena Bar. There are two mysteries in this case. The first one is the identity of DB Cooper. The second is how did the money arrive at Tena Bar. The answer to both of those is unknown, but we can be as certain as possible that moving the flight path to account for the money find is untenable and not in accordance with any factual evidence.
The only question we should be asking ourselves - outside of the the identity of DB Cooper - is how did the money arrive here of the plane was over here.
