The question is whether Ammerman was ARTCC or TRACON. he said he was at SEATAC. the ARTCC has been away from the airport since 1962.
TRACON handles flights coming in and flights taking off then it's handed off to ARTCC.
ARTCCs, usually referred to as "Centers," are established primarily to provide Air Traffic Service to aircraft operating on IFR flight plans within the controlled airspace, and principally during the en route phase of flight.
There are 21 Air Route Traffic Control Centers (ARTCC) in the United States.
Any aircraft operating under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) within the confines of an ARTCC's airspace is controlled by air traffic controllers at the Center. This includes all sorts of different types of aircraft: privately owned single engine aircraft, commuter airlines, military jets and commercial airlines.
Is the information I've provided inaccurate or is Ammerman going off second hand information? he sounds like he knows what he's talking about.
It is my understanding that the radar system for the Seattle area was physically located at McChord AFB. It would probably be operated by USAF military and civilian personnel. The FAA air traffic controllers may not have been directly involved in its operation.
There was probably a Memorandum of Understanding between the USAF and the FAA about the use of the radar data. In any event, the Seattle air traffic controllers in Auburn would have displays from this radar at their work stations. The Auburn controllers probably had displays from radar systems in the Spokane area as well as other areas for which they were responsible for air traffic control.
The approach and departure controllers at SEATAC would also have displays from the McChord radar and/or they might also have displays from lower powered radars located at SEATAC itself. These controllers would probably be located in the SEATAC tower building very close to the tower controllers who were looking out the windows. All of these people would work very closely together.
The NWA airliner was cleared for take-off on the ground control frequency and told to contact the Seattle ATC center directly on a specific frequency. They therefore bypassed the tower controller and the departure controller. Apparently there was some confusion between the SEATAC tower controllers and the ATC controllers in Auburn. When the airliner contacted the Auburn controllers, they were apparently taken by surprise and had to ask the airliner for information. This took a couple of minutes to clear up and I think it is discussed in the "FBI Notes" and other places.
In the Portland area, there was probably a low power radar station that provided coverage that was not available from the Seattle ATC radar system. This station would probably be located on the PIA property (maybe on top of the tower cab). Presumably it was just such a station that claimed to have tracked the airliner in the Portland area. This station would be entirely separate from the enroute radar network at Auburn. The mountains between Seattle and Portland would block the two radars.
Previous posts on this site have stated that the F-106s broke off their trailing of the airliner, climbed to 20,000 feet, and headed east while still north of the Columbia River. Ammerman claims to have been the controller who worked the intercept problem between the T-33 (and also presumably the F-106s) and the airliner. He would almost certainly have been at the Seattle ATC in Auburn. Also, he would probably have been assisted by several other people. And I imagine that the most senior managers at the Auburn facility were looking over his should (and that of the other controllers involved) as he worked the interception. This hijacking was not a routine event so it would be an "all hands on deck" situation.
Ammerman has apparently told Georger that he was not looking at his radar display from some point where the airliner was north of the Columbia River until it was south of the Columbia River. But you can rest assured that someone was looking at that display. And it appears that the other people were giving the airliner instructions that Ammerman was not aware of while he was working on the interception matter.
During the hand off to the Oakland Center, at least four Oakland controllers were involved. Only one Seattle Center controller was involved apparently.