Robert,
What you are describing is standard operating procedure in regular circumstances.

The crew of 305 was dealing with an active hijacking - one in which the hijacker said that radio transmission might detonate the bomb. They were likely distracted in the cockpit or unwilling to continually operate the radio. I've spoken with several air traffic controllers about this very situation, and they have told me that there have been quite a few cases of an aircraft that hasn't been in communications long enough for a fighter jet to be scrambled. It happens once every few years. They even have a name for it: NORDO or NO RaDiO.

Either way, the evidence is unmistakable that R2 passed 305 on to a high altitude frequency based in Redmond, OR. Cliff Ammerman's own statements confirm this. Whether they could not reach Redmond due to the Cascades or the transcriber listened to the wrong recordings, we don't know.

Lastly, Larry Carr never said anything to me about redactions at all - not in the ATC transcripts and not in the ARINC TTY, and I never ever said that he had.

Chaucer, please read carefully.

The NWA 305 situation was NOT a "no radio" situation.  They were apparently not able to raise one station on one frequency.  They would certainly not keep trying for 14 minutes.  They would go back to the previous controller and he would get the matter straightened out fast.

For the record, the FAA does have established procedures for when an aircraft and controllers completely lose the ability to communicate.  But that was not the actual case here.

With respect to your last sentence in the above quote, refer to my post #8114 above.

Robert,
It looks like you misunderstood. When I said that Carr told me that the transcript of comms between 305 and Flight Operations existed, but hadn’t been released yet, he was referring to the regular release of FBI documents from the Cooper Vault. Specifically, he was referring to fully transcribed communications between the crew of 305 and Flight Operations in Minneapolis, not the ARINC TTY.

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This was not in reference to any holdbacks or redactions.

Regarding the missing comms, I have spoken to half a dozen professional air traffic controllers, and Dr. Edwards has spoken with one. Respectfully, I’m going to choose to believe them over you.

Chaucer, are you and the controllers you talked to actually claiming that there was a 14 minutes period when the airline crew and air traffic controllers didn't talk to each other?  Remember that this is the 1971 time frame.

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Chaucer, are you and the controllers you talked to actually claiming that there was a 14 minutes period when the airline crew and air traffic controllers didn't talk to each other?  Remember that this is the 1971 time frame.

Also, Dr. Edwards:

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My question: was there, in 1971, a protocol for the hand-off from one sector to another?]
"There was no stated protocol [for a hand-off], however, one would initiate a handoff a few minutes before the aircraft entered the next sector. Depending on the speed of the aircraft the distance would vary."

When one reads the transcripts it is obvious that NW305s cockpit crew is very busy and somewhat distracted in their radio transmissions. If NW305 did not receive a response on 133.9 [mHz] and could not remember the last assigned frequency, this would explain why it took so long to contact sector [R]5."

* At 1959:15 PST, the pilot monitoring acknowledges on 128.3 mHz and reads back correctly. Normal procedure here would be to set the standby radio to 133.9 mHz and then switch it from standby to active; in this case 128.3 mHz becomes the standby frequency. However, it is also possible that the pilot simply re-dials the active radio to 133.9 mHz, thereby losing a ready reference to the previous frequency.

* In my reconstruction, at some subsequent time, the pilot monitoring makes a transmission on 133.9 mHz. He receives no reply (because the High Cascades block the signal to the Redmond site). Since no controller at Seattle ARTCC has heard this call, there is no record in the transcript.

* Possibly, Flight 305 makes repeated attempts to call on 133.9 mHz; possibly, these attempts take several minutes.

* In this event, the normal procedure is to call on the last working frequency (in this case, 128.3 mHz, monitored by R2); but evidently Flight 305 does not do this, since there is no record of further communications between Flight 305 and R2.

* I conjecture that the pilot monitoring then refers to En Route Chart L-1 (which he surely has on board) and searches for the low-sector frequencies for Seattle ARTCC. It's possible that he tries several low-sector frequencies and receives no reply, because the corresponding RCAGs are out of range or are blocked by terrain. Possibly, this takes several minutes.

* Before or after this conjectured confusion, but sometime before 2005 PST, the crew transmit to Northwest Airlines, on the private ARINC frequency, that they have spoken with the hijacker (in what would prove to be their last contact with him). An ARINC teletype operator, somewhere in the USA, transcribes this message in real time and hits the "send" button, which generates the time-stamp 2005 PST.

* Sometime between the ARINC time-stamps for 2010 and 2012 PST, a crew member (probably the pilot monitoring) transmits to Northwest Airlines to report the "oscillations in the cabin" and his feeling that the hijacker is "doing something with the air stairs". In this pilot's mind at least, the hijacker is still on board the airplane. Two Northwest employees who are in the loop (Captain Robert Lowenthal and another person, unidentified) make handwritten notes of this transmission; both record the time as 2011 PST.

* At 2013:14 PST, the pilot monitoring tries a transmission on 120.9 mHz (which, as per the L-1 Chart for 1971, is assigned to the low-altitude sectors at both Redmond and Scappoose remote sites). He gives his call-sign, incorrectly, as "four oh five"; probably he corrects it immediately (the transmission is unintelligible at this point). He unnecessarily includes the phrase "twenty point nine", surely a shorthand for "120.9"; possibly this is to indicate that it is a cold call (with no prior instruction from air traffic control). If there is a controller monitoring the Redmond low-altitude sector, he or she does not hear the transmission (again, it would be blocked by the High Cascades). But the controller on R5, monitoring the remote site at Scappoose, hears it. At this point, the transcript resumes.

* Shortly after 2013:14 PST, controller R5 calls Flight 305 and asks them to squawk "ident" (i.e. to press the "ident" button on the transponder). This enables him to identify the radar signature of Flight 305 and to distinguish it from other traffic.

My suggestion to you is to speak to Dr. Edwards directly as I have. I know you have a good relationship with him. He is the one who has done the heavy lifting on this subject. I merely provided confirmation of what the 133.9 mHz frequency was.

Chaucer, may I suggest that you read Dr. Edwards blog posts of yesterday (11-02-22) and today (11-03-22) in which he expands on his original post.

You are apparently now saying that Carr stated that in addition to the ARINC teletype transcripts, some of which are missing, there are transcripts of the entire ARINC voice communications and that the voice transcripts have never been released but that Carr has seen them.  Presumably, he has also seen the missing teletype transcripts.  Then, of course, we have the missing or redacted Seattle ATC radio transcripts between the airliner for the same time frame.  What actually happened during that time frame can only be cleared up when those transcripts are released.

On the matter of handoffs between controllers, there are two perfect examples of how things were handled in 1971 in the Oakland ATC radio transcripts.  Look at those transcripts starting at 9:44 PM PST.  Seattle ATC controller L.E. (those are his initials) was in telephone contact with Oakland ATC controllers J.M. and W.X. (their initials) and notice that Oakland only contacted the airliner after they had identified him on radar.  Later notice how the Oakland controller and the Reno controller handled the handoff to Reno.  Other air traffic personnel were also involved in the Oakland handoffs.

One of the first things the Oakland controller told the airliner was "NWA 305 anything you are requesting is approved."  Before taking off from Seattle, NWA 305 was told that it had approval to do anything it wanted to do and that the controllers would keep other aircraft out of its way.  In the Oakland ATC area, it was only the Oakland and/or Reno controller on the same frequency as the airliner.  It was probably the same in the Seattle ATC area with other aircraft using another frequency.

I simply cannot imagine that the airliner and controllers were out of contact for 14 minutes under the existing circumstances.

On the matter of handoffs between controllers, there are two perfect examples of how things were handled in 1971 in the Oakland ATC radio transcripts.  Look at those transcripts starting at 9:44 PM PST.  Seattle ATC controller L.E. (those are his initials) was in telephone contact with Oakland ATC controllers J.M. and W.X. (their initials) and notice that Oakland only contacted the airliner after they had identified him on radar.  Later notice how the Oakland controller and the Reno controller handled the handoff to Reno.  Other air traffic personnel were also involved in the Oakland handoffs.

One of the first things the Oakland controller told the airliner was "NWA 305 anything you are requesting is approved."  Before taking off from Seattle, NWA 305 was told that it had approval to do anything it wanted to do and that the controllers would keep other aircraft out of its way.  In the Oakland ATC area, it was only the Oakland and/or Reno controller on the same frequency as the airliner.  It was probably the same in the Seattle ATC area with other aircraft using another frequency.

I simply cannot imagine that the airliner and controllers were out of contact for 14 minutes under the existing circumstances.

There are three reasonable explanations as I see it. There could be more:

1. Flight 305 was not able to raise Seattle on 133.9 mHz and was too busy during that period of time to worry about it. Then Anderson used the L-1 charts to locate the next low altitude frequency.

2. Flight 305 was not able to raise Seattle on 133.9 mHz and kicked it back to R2. This caused confusion later on and the transcriber was given the incorrect tapes to transcribe - tapes that had no comms on them for that period.

3. Flight 305 was able to raise Seattle on 133.9 mHz and communicated them for the next 14 minutes. Because this is a high altitude frequency, the transcriber was given the incorrect tapes to transcribe -tapes that had no comms for that period.

Based on Dr. Edward's recent posts that you pointed out, the one of the first two seem most likely.
[/quote]

Chaucer, your comments above don't have anything to do with the handoffs to the Oakland and Reno controllers.  The handoff to the Oakland controller was about 90 minutes after the matter with the 133.9 frequency.

Apparently there were Lycopodium spores found on the tie.
One of the uses for this stuff was their use
in absolute diatom testing.

Question:
Was there anyone that was both involved with the tie and also diatom testing where there could possibly have been an issue of transference happening?

Thanks

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Apparently there were Lycopodium spores found on the tie.
One of the uses for this stuff was their use
in absolute diatom testing.

Question:
Was there anyone that was both involved with the tie and also diatom testing where there could possibly have been an issue of transference happening?

Thanks

Those spores were also in pill bottles, and in fingerprinting powders in use by the FBI. According to Tom Kaye, they are an investigatory dead end.

I wasn't looking at it as an investigatory lead.
I was just wondering if it was known if there was anyone who had possession of the tie and was doing diatom testing as well.
Thanks in advance.

The Grey Cup happened the Sunday after the hijacking in Victoria, B.C. During the pregame activities a man wearing what appears to be a suit parachutes onto the field. Wonder if he was ever checked out? I remember the Cooper letters that were probably fake saying that he enjoyed the Grey Cup.

During the weekend of Cooper Con, I had the distinct honor of being invited - along with some other Cooper researchers - to the residence of the grandson of Ralph Himmelsbach. He had inherited his grandfather's NORJACK files, and he felt they would be of more value to us than him.

There were many things of value in Himmelsbach's stash, but among them was the complete, intact, unredacted ARINC teletype from the night of the hijacking. I suspect that it is the original from the night of the hijacking. Regardless, it is a priceless piece of information.

Based on my analysis, the comparison of these ARINC teletype copies  with those previously released reveal NO redactions related to the Flight 305. Any inconsistencies can be explained by being communications not related to the Flight 305 hijacking. Thus, these complete, intact ARINC teletype do NOT indicate any attempt to conceal, cover up, or obfuscate on the part of the FBI, FAA, or NWA.

Here, in their entirety, are the complete ARINC teletype printouts from Ralph Himmelsbach's own files:

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I will have more interesting files forthcoming. Enjoy!