Eric Ulis has posted a new video:



I have spoken with Eric about this, and I have no doubt that this is what Cliff Ammerman told him. However, I am having a hard time finding Ammerman’s account credible.

First, if a plane was given the wrong frequency and handed off to the wrong radar sector, that ATC would instantly recognize that plane’s altitude and immediately correct the error. I find it inconceivable that it would take 14 minutes to figure out the problem and fix it.

Second, R4 covers Malay from Battleground, and the 7:59 to 8:13 “missing minutes” covers this area perfectly in terms of flight time. Is this just an incredible coincidence that it took this exact amount of time to get 305 back to Ammerman? Or are we to believe that the wrong ATC decided to simply handle 305 for it’s duration of it’s journey trough R4? That seems hard to believe. 

Third, based on the maps below, R16 isn’t even in the correct area. It doesn’t cover the high altitude area from Malay to Battleground but an area farther south and east. Granted, it is possible that these sectors have changed since 1971, but the low altitude sectors have remained unchanged. Unless there’s documentation otherwise, it is reasonable to assume that the high altitude sectors have not changed either. So, what gives?

Fourth, why has Ammerman’s account changed so dramatically from his original statements? Why was this never revealed by him before? This would be a huge development and it seems CA is simply shrugging his shoulders and saying “Oh, yeah, I forgot.” I’m not even sure how to process Ammerman’s story about allowing R6 to handle 305. He’s never said this before and there’s no documentation that he ever did this.

I’m in the process of seeking an air traffic controller to get some more insight and see if this new scenario of Ammerman’s is true.

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Eric Ulis has posted a new video:



I have spoken with Eric about this, and I have no doubt that this is what Cliff Ammerman told him. However, I am having a hard time finding Ammerman’s account credible.

First, if a plane was given the wrong frequency and handed off to the wrong radar sector, that ATC would instantly recognize that plane’s altitude and immediately correct the error. I find it inconceivable that it would take 14 minutes to figure out the problem and fix it.

Second, R4 covers Malay from Battleground, and the 7:59 to 8:13 “missing minutes” covers this area perfectly in terms of flight time. Is this just an incredible coincidence that it took this exact amount of time to get 305 back to Ammerman? Or are we to believe that the wrong ATC decided to simply handle 305 for it’s duration of it’s journey trough R4? That seems hard to believe. 

Third, based on the maps below, R16 isn’t even in the correct area. It doesn’t cover the high altitude area from Malay to Battleground but an area farther south and east. Granted, it is possible that these sectors have changed since 1971, but the low altitude sectors have remained unchanged. Unless there’s documentation otherwise, it is reasonable to assume that the high altitude sectors have not changed either. So, what gives?

Fourth, why has Ammerman’s account changed so dramatically from his original statements? Why was this never revealed by him before? This would be a huge development and it seems CA is simply shrugging his shoulders and saying “Oh, yeah, I forgot.” I’m not even sure how to process Ammerman’s story about allowing R6 to handle 305. He’s never said this before and there’s no documentation that he ever did this.

I’m in the process of seeking an air traffic controller to get some more insight and see if this new scenario of Ammerman’s is true.

I saw the video the other day, and I also thought it odd that this was just coming out now.  But, also thought that maybe it was stated previously and I simply missed it.

R99, does that 14 minute period correspond to the time frame you mention the WSHM says is redacted or missing ?  Or am I mucking this all up..?

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R99, does that 14 minute period correspond to the time frame you mention the WSHM says is redacted or missing ?  Or am I mucking this all up..?

JAG, I'm afraid I don't find the Ulis/Ammerman explanation very convincing.  You are not mucking anything up.

When I joined DropZone in 2009, before I made my first post, I obtained copies of the IFR Enroute Low Altitude Charts L1/L2, which were in effect on the day of the hijacking, from the National Archives and Records Administration (which is the same organization that is currently in the media).  They were in digital format on disks and I had a photographic company print out a hard copy for my personal use.  The total cost was about $400 not counting the cost of antiacids that I needed in dealing with a certain NARA sub-contractor.  Anyway, I sent Sluggo a copy of the disks and he printed out copies that are on his website (wherever that site is today).  Eventually, I sent all of the original disks to Fred Poyner at the WSHM and they are available on that site today.

Here is a general picture of how airspace was divided in 1971.  From sea level (or ground level) to 18,000 feet, IFR traffic used the Low Altitude Charts for navigation and the airways were named Victor Airways.  Everything from 18,000 to 60,000 feet used the High Altitude Charts and were named Jet Airways.  Above 60,000 feet, everything was VFR (not IFR) and point-to-point.

Cooper specified that the airliner was not to fly above 10,000 feet above sea level.  This is also the minimum altitude for obstacle clearance and radio navigation/communications reception on the flight south from SEATAC.  These altitudes were established for air traffic control purposes on V-23.

At times during this segment, radio contact with ARINC was lost and communications were relayed by two other airliners to an ARINC facility.  When in the California area, Oakland Air Traffic Control told the airliner to switch to the Sacramento ARINC frequency and they did so.  But this did not have anything to do with air traffic control.

In the Seattle Air Traffic Control radio transcripts, a total of 19 areas of redactions are indicated.  There were no redactions indicated in the Oakland Air Traffic Control radio transcripts.

The roll of ARINC teletype transcripts included with the Harrison papers was made avail to Fred Poyner at the WSHM.  He made a study of what was on that roll, which had been sliced up considerably, and the public released teletype transcripts.

Poyner concluded that there were 8 areas in the ARINC transcripts of "missing, or redacted, teletype print copy, with each area made up of one or more individual 'blocks' or entries of text."  He listed a total of 30 "entries of text" that were missing for the period from 4:45 PM to 8:05 PM PST, inclusive.

Poyner also concluded that there was nothing missing between time stamps for 8:10 PM to 8:24 PM PST when compared to the public released transcripts for this time period.

For anyone wishing to pursue this further, the Seattle and Oakland Air Traffic Control transcripts and some of the ARINC teletype transcripts are posted here on Shutter's site.  Fred Poyner's analysis, or at least part of it, may be available on the WSHM web page.       

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I obtained copies of the IFR Enroute Low Altitude Charts L1/L2, which were in effect on the day of the hijacking, from the National Archives and Records Administration (which is the same organization that is currently in the media).  Anyway, I sent Sluggo a copy of the disks and he printed out copies that are on his website (wherever that site is today). 

I have looked on Sluggo's site for these low atltude maps, but I can't locate them. Did he post them publicly?