A couple of different 302s that folks here sent me. Blew my mind, too. I'll go dig 'em up. They're going in the 3rd Edition, for sure.
Here's Chapter 40. The juicy stuff is in the first few paragraphs.
Chapter 40
Assessing the FBI’s 45-year investigation
The FBI is arguably the world’s best investigatory organization. So, why can’t they solve the DB Cooper case?
I asked former SA Gary Tallis that question, and his reply surprised me: “Because they haven’t found a body. If we had a body, all the answers would follow.”
But what happens to an investigation when there isn’t a body? Add to that conundrum, how should the FBI proceed when they have so little tangible evidence? It’s not an easy job, I admit. Losing evidence doesn’t help, either. But large bureaucracies experience screw-ups, lose stuff, and have less-than-adequate agents sprinkled throughout the organization, even at managerial levels. So, after their 45 years of investigating DB Cooper, how did they do?
There seems to be six distinct phases of the FBI’s Norjak investigation. The initial phase lasted for several years, and featured a full-court press from the Bureau, where they even investigated gentlemen nationwide who possessed the last name of Cooper. The bureaucracy’s reach was massive – interviewing SOG troopers returning home from Vietnam, chasing after copycats and ex-cons, and investigating skydiving centers, such as Elsinore. Or tromping through the woods in Amboy, searching hundreds of buildings throughout Clark County, or interviewing cabbies and waitresses in Portland.
However, by 1976 the Bureau’s momentum began to fade, as the FBI realized they had very little critical evidence. As a result, Phase Two emerged, characterized by the strategizing of original measures, even desperate ones that might generate some investigatory traction.
The FBI held a Pow-Wow that summer in San Francisco that included agents from Seattle, Portland, Las Vegas and San Francisco, along with top brass from the HQ. They discussed the status of their Norjak investigation, and admitted they were stymied. The Bureau felt they didn’t have a strong case to arrest or convict DB Cooper if apprehended. Simply, they didn’t trust their ten eye-witnesses – the three flight attendants, the two NWO gate and ticket agents, and five passengers - due to the variances in sketches. Plus, they had no physical evidence other than the placard find – remember this was before the money find at Tina Bar - and the 60 fingerprint samples from Reno were too smudged or too limited in scale to be legally probative.
In addition, they had lost confidence in their initial assessment on LZ-A, and determined the jump zone was ten miles south of their initial estimates. This put Cooper’s landing in the area of Hochinson, Washington.
Hence, they decided they needed DB Cooper to make a confession, as is described in a memo titled: “DB Cooper-19823.”
As a result, the FBI considered offering DB Cooper an immunity deal in exchange for the return of the $200,000. The Bureau pondered announcing this arrangement as part of the annual Cooper extravaganza in November 1976, and began tasking agents to contact local media outlets. However, the FBI never followed through for reasons that are unknown at this time.
This malaise lingered until the money find in 1980 at Tina Bar, triggering Phase Three. However, after the initial push to recover money - digging for days at the beach and an analysis by Dr, Leonard Palmer - this momentum eventually floundered as well, partially due to Ralph Himmelsbach’s retirement two weeks after the money retrieval. His successor in Portland, Dorwin Schreuder, told me that he and his division did not institute any investigatory efforts and only waited for the public to bring them leads. Whatever the Seattle Division’s perspective was remains shrouded in secrecy since case agent Ron Nichols refuses to discuss his investigatory efforts in any manner. Regardless, nothing was found or advanced during the 1980s, so perhaps Nichols has nothing of substance to say.
In addition, the FBI’s top witness, Tina Mucklow, was in her cloistered convent by then, and according to multiple FBI agents her memory was impaired.
As a result, a second Pow-Wow was held in San Francisco in 1986, and by then the Bureau’s Norjak lethargy was institutionalized. Nevertheless, another “Hail Mary” effort was concocted, pegged to the release of the movie: The Pursuit of DB Cooper. As part of their promotional campaign, Universal Studios announced a $1 million reward for information leading to the arrest and conviction of Dan Cooper. However, it didn’t create any leads, directly.
But Hollywood’s offer did produce a lead for the FBI. An unknown letter-writer, who signed his offer, “sincerely not yours, d.b. cooper,” contacted the Bureau and agreed to surrender, but only if he could keep the film’s reward. In addition, he wanted his skypiracy prison term reduced to just one-year, and he demanded placement in a minimum-security federal prison. Further, “d.b. cooper” offered to repay Northwest Orient the $200,000 ransom. However, the FBI declined the offer, as per 164-81-8586.
Entering the 1990s, the Norjak investigation was dormant, signaling Phase Four. Evidence was reviewed by 1996, though, and an effort was launched to organize the physical evidence.
Sadly, Bureau discovered that all of the material stored in Las Vegas has been “destroyed,” presumably the cigarette butts as well, per SE-164A-81-9288.
Nonetheless, gadflies like Jo Weber and citizen sleuths, such as Galen Cook, began stirring the pot, signaling the beginning of Phase Five. By 2003, someone in the Bureau decided to “process” the cigarette butts, and DNA was being sought for suspects. In 2004, Galen sued the Bureau for access to the Norjak files, and this may be considered to be the “official” starting date for a real partnership between citizen sleuths and the FBI. I consider this development to be Phase Six, and it remains the current status of the investigation even though the FBI has officially closed the case.
Assessing these phases, we can identify particular people, places, and events that have been problematic. Some items might have resolution, some might not. But first, let’s talk about the Bureau’s successes:
What the FBI did right:
I say the Bureau did all the basics fairly well – securing the airliner and airport perimeters on the night of the skyjacking, interviewing airport employees to ascertain where Cooper came from and when, and debriefing the passengers at Sea-Tac and the crew in Reno. Later, the FBI did what it does so well – a massive, blanket investigation of person’s named Cooper, skydivers and soldiers, and all those lovelorn fellas that got thrown under the bus by their broken-hearted ladies.
The dig at Tina Bar was conducted adequately, in general, as all evidence indicates that the search was done thoughtfully and comprehensively. Yes, they could have taken more pictures, especially of the shards.
Larry Carr’s actions are stellar, as well. Establishing the Citizen Sleuths was superb, as was his posting on DB Cooper chat rooms.
But there is room for improvement. High on the list is lost evidence or poorly collected evidence, such as the fingerprints. Here’s a specific list:
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